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Amending the Constitution to
Cripple Treaties
Zechariah Chafee, Jr.*
At a time when our country is assuming heavier responsi-
bilities in foreign affairs than ever before, a powerful movement
is under way to obtain the adoption of a constitutional amend-
ment which will diminish the ability of the government of the
United States to carry out its agreements with other nations.
Several different drafts for such an amendment have been pro-
mulgated from various sources. Two of especial significance will
be examined in this article, one which the American Bar Associa-
tion has recommended to Congress for consideration and the
other introduced in the Senate by Senator Bricker of Ohio. The
writer wants to make it plain that both these drafts and any
other similar proposal are very objectionable, and that the
Constitution should not be amended to cripple the treaty power.
The treaty clauses which were framed with great care by the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 have worked admirably for a
century and a half and constantly enabled our nation to take
its proper place in the world. In the present period of great
emergency, it would be disastrous to change the Constitution
so as to make ourselves incapable of bargaining like a great
nation, or even a little one.
THE TREATY CLAUSES IN THE CONSTITUTION
The treaty-making powers of the United States are granted
by two clauses. First, Article II, Section 2, says of the President:
"He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur. "
Second, the supremacy clause in Article VI, almost at the end
of the original Constitution, provides:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
* University Professor, Harvard University.
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made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."
WHY THIS TERROR OF TREATIES?
The strange terror of treaties which has suddenly spread over
the land and created novel fears that the familiar language just
quoted will somehow or other take away our fundamental liber-
ties plainly stems from the opponents of the Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, and other
potential international agreements which are under consideration
in the United Nations. I happen to believe that some of the objec-
tions to these documents are greatly exaggerated, while others
can be removed before they reach final form.' But all that is
irrelevant to my antagonism to the proposed constitutional amend-
ment. I do not mind much if these UN measures are rejected by
our government; they will help only a little for a long time to
come, and when a brighter day arrives there will be other ways
to promote human rights over the world. But I do care very
greatly about the United States Constitution. The Constitution
must not be warped and weakened.
The Constitution as it stands provides adequate safeguards
against any United Nations treaty which is open to well-founded
objections. This will appear in the course of this article. No
amendment is needed to protect us against unwise treaties.
The most important thing to remember about this suggested
change in the Constitution is that its consequences will go far
beyond any UN agreement and any matters of human rights.
This amendment will block the enforcement of many familiar
kinds of treaties relating to the ownership of property, the privi-
leges of doing business, and the protection of pecuniary rights
of foreigners in American courts and Americans in foreign courts.
1. A bibliography of the controversy about the Covenant is printed In
Chafee, Some Problems of the Draft International Covenant on Human
Rights, 95 Proc. Am. Philosophical Soc. 471, 488-489 (1951). To this should
be added the Reports of the ABA Peace and Law Committee for September
1951 and February 1952; and the Proceedings of the American Bar Associa-
tion Section on International and Comparative Law 38 (September 18-19,
1951).
[VOL. XII
CRIPPLING TREATIES
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION DRAFT A.VIENDIENT
The bar association proposal originated in its Committee on
Peace and Law Through United Nations, which consists of seven
lawyers. Although its recommendations have usually, as in this
instance, received the approval of the House of Delegates, the
law-making body in the association, they are by no means the
views of all the members of the American Bar Association. Quite
a different attitude toward UN documents and toward this
amendment has been taken by the association's Section of Inter-
national and Comparative Law. That Section is composed of
approximately eight hundred members. The membership is
drawn not only from lawyers and law teachers who have a
special interest in international law because they are dealing
professionally with problems of treaties and other aspects of
international law, but also from general practitioners who feel
that they can help in solving the problems of an effective and
free world order by participating in the committee work of the
Section and its democratically conducted forums where they
have an opportunity to present any ideas that they have which
will aid in building the structure of enduring peace.
A committee of the Section on the Constitutional Aspects
of International Agreements undertook, under the chairmanship
of Harold E. Stassen until December, 1951, and Edgar Turlington
thereafter, to make a thorough study of the problems raised by
this amendment. This work, when completed, would have been
very helpful to the House of Delegates in considering their deci-
sion on the proposed amendment. In September, 1951, the Section
committee, in an interim report, stated:
"We concur in the wisdom of further study of the pro-
posed amendment, but we of the Section committee are not
convinced of its necessity, nor of the correctness of its terms
to carry out the announced purpose." 2
However, the Committee on Peace and Law Through United
Nations has much more influence in the American Bar Associa-
tion than the Section on International and Comparative Law.
The name of this committee was once appropriate. It was organ-
ized in February, 1944, and had referred to it resolutions of the
House of Delegates that "a permanent organization of the nations
2. Proceedings of the American Bar Association Section on International
and Comparative Law, 38 (September 18-19, 1951).
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be established for the purpose of maintaining peace by legal
sanctions and the suppression of aggressive war . . .; and that
the. United States should become a member and share full
responsibility for its activities" within our Constitution. In
December, 1945, the committee reported a resolution, which the
association adopted, "that the interests of world peace and the
rule of law will be best served by united American support for
the United Nations Organization and its full functioning at the
earliest possible moment. . . ." Meanwhile, the President of the
American Bar Association, David A. Simmons, was a consultant
at the San Francisco Conference and had a great deal to do with
getting the. human rights provisions inserted in the Charter. 8 It
is nearly four years, however, since the Committee on Peace and
Law Through United Nations gave positive support to a specific
measure proposed in the United Nations. Its recent reports have
mostly consisted of vigorous attacks against whatever the United
Nations thought might be desirable to do for the promotion of
human rights. The committee's arguments have carried great
weight in the House of Delegates, the American press, and the
Senate.
Although the ratification by the United States of any con-
ceivable UN treaty on human rights has become very improbable,
the possibility that such a treaty might somehow get through
led the Peace and Law Committee in 1950 to expand its activities
from opposing United Nations measures to opposing an impor-
tant part of the United States Constitution.4 Insistence on the
desirability of amending the treaty clauses eventually produced
the draft which the committee laid before the House of Delegates
in February, 1952.
Some of the motivation for the bar association draft as a
combination of old states'-rights attitudes and current hostility
to United Nations measures on human rights is shown by
extracts from the latest report of the Peace and Law Committee: 5
the treaty clause of the Constitution in Article VI
contains, as stated by Henry St. George Tucker,6 ... all the
3. Simmons, The San Francisco Conference, 31 A.B.A.J. 332, 378-379
(July 1945); Simmons, Man's One Fundamental Human Right: To Be Let
Alone, 36 A.B.A.J. 711, 712 (September 1950).
4. Report of the American Bar Association Committee for Peace and
Law Through United Nations, 3-25 (September 1, 1950).
5. Report of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on
Peace and Law Through United Nations, 5, 6, 7, 17 (February 1, 1952).
6. Tucker, Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power (1915) took a con-
siderably narrower view of the proper scope of the treaty power than the
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elements of a 'Trojan horse' . . . in imposing domestic law on
the several states of the union through treaties with foreign
nations, which, in the absence of such treaties, could not be
imposed
"Richard Henry Lee of Virginia and Patrick Henry of
Virginia both strongly objected to the provision concern-
ing treaties at the time the adoption of the Constitution was
under debate.7
"... since the State Department has undertaken to nego-
tiate so extensively with foreign nations in this new area...,
regarding the relationship of a government to its own citi-
zens, and on the precautionary assumption that this cause
might be judicially approved, your Committee has prepared
its draft amendment to the Constitution in respect of the
treaty-making power...
"If, to use Henry St. George Tucker's colorful phrase,
the present treaty clause is a Trojan horse, the proposed text
will drive the beast outside the walls without more damage
done, and with its remaining armoured soldiery securely
locked within."
Few tasks undertaken by the American Bar Association are
more important than considering proposed amendments to the
United States Constitution. The Section on International and
Comparative Law thus asked, at the February, 1952, meeting of
the House of Delegates, that the matter be put over until the
next meeting (in September, 1952). The Bricker draft amend-
-ment had just been introduced in the Senate; delay would give
the section and the Peace and Law Committee time to study its
provisions, which differ considerably from the bar association
United States Supreme Court and several other writers on constitutional law.
See the favorable review by Wilson, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 826 (1915). Compare
with Tucker's position, 2 Story on the Constitution §§ 1505-1523 (2 ed. 1851);
Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution §§ 33-35 (1922); 1 Willoughby,
The Constitutional Law of the United States, c. XXXIII (2 ed. 1929); Corwin,
National Supremacy: Treaty Power v. State Power (1913).
7. If we are to amend out of the Constitution all the provisions to which
Patrick Henry objected (see the index to his speeches in the Virginia ratify-
ing convention In 3 Elliot, Debates, viii-x [2 ed. 1836]) there will not be much
left of it. Henry was later counsel for the debtors in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
199 (1796). Incidentally, George Washington, James Madison, and John Mar-
shall were also from Virginia. Significantly, the Confederate Constitution
took over the whole supremacy clause. Tucker, The Treaty-Making Power
under the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, 1 Va. L. Rev.
596 (1914). Tucker consoles himself by saying that the Confederate courts
would have interpreted the clause differently, but that is one of the things
we shall never know.
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proposal (as hereinafter noted). Nevertheless, the Board of
Governors recommended the House of Delegates to pass immedi-
ately the Peace and Law Committee's resolution, recommending
its draft amendment to Congress for consideration. And the
House, after listening to oral arguments, did so on February 26,
1952, the same day the draft was presented. This bar association
draft, which will be analyzed shortly, is as follows:s
"A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any pro-
vision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.
A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United
States only through legislation by Congress which it could
enact under its delegated powers in the absence of such
treaty."
THE BRICKER DRAFT AMENDMENT
Senator Bricker's proposal to amend the treaty clauses in
the Constitution also stems from opposition to the same United
Nations measures. His interest in this area was first expressed
in the Senate on July 17, 1951, when he introduced a Senate
Resolution condemning the Draft International Covenant on
Human Rights and asking the President to instruct our represen-
tatives at the United Nations to withdraw from further negotia-
tions about the Covenant and so on." During the ensuing debate,
which in the Congressional Record is entitled "The State Depart-
ment Endangers Freedom of the Press," the Ohio senator spent
several pages calling the free speech article in the Covenant an
attempt to destroy our cherished freedoms. He denounced those
who drafted it as supporters of tyranny and totalitarianism,
although they all happened to be determned supporters of free-
dom of the press and included the editors of the Christian Science
Monitor and the Montreal Star, the publishers of the Providence
Journal and the Houston Post, Pertinax, the chief French col-
umnist, editors from Holland and Norway, who had operated
underground newspapers at the risk of their lives during the
Nazi occupation, and a Czech editor who helped Masaryk free
his country from Austria, was kept six years in Buchenwald by
the Nazis, and finally was thrown out of his paper by the Com-
munists in 1948 and exiled.
On September 14, 1951, Mr. Bricker again spoke of proposed
8. Report, supra note 5, at 3.
9. S. Res. 177, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 97 Cong. Ree. 8443 (July 17, 1951).
The ensuing debate appears at pp. 8443-8457.
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international agreements as infringing our Bill of Rights, and
announced a joint resolution for a constitutional amendment on
the whole issue of treaties and international agreements.' 0
Finally, on February 7, 1952, Senator Bricker introduced
Senate Joint Resolution 130-the draft here to be considered.
His resolution was sponsored by about fifty-five other senators,
some evidently because they thought the subject important
enough to deserve examination although they did not neces-
sarily favor such an amendment. During the debate which fol-
lowed, Senator Bricker paid "tribute to the magnificent work of
the American Bar Association and its committee on peace and
law through United Nations," " which had plainly supplied a
good deal of his ammunition. Senator Bricker's draft amendment
follows: 12
"Section 1. No treaty or executive agreement shall be
made respecting the rights of citizens of the United States
protected by this Constitution, or abridging or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.
"Section 2. No treaty or executive agreement shall vest
in any international organization or in any foreign power
any of the legislative, executive, or judicial powers vested
by this Constitution in the Congress, the President, and in
the courts of the United States, respectively.
"Section 3. No treaty or executive agreement shall alter
or abridge the laws of the United States or the Constitution
or laws of the several States unless, and then only to the
extent that, Congress shall so provide by Act or joint
resolution."
(Section 4 restricts executive agreements. Section 5
gives Congress power to enforce agreement by appropriate
legislation. Section 6 requires ratification of amendment by
state legislatures within seven years.)
ANALYSIS OF THE TWO DRAFTS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT
The bar association draft falls into three separate parts:
(1) It declares to be void a treaty provision which conflicts
with anything in the Constitution.
10. 97 Cong. Rec. 11592 (September 14, 1951) mentioning but not printing
S.J. Res. 102.
11. 98 Cong. Rec. 920-928 (February 7, 1952).
12. S.J. Res. 130, printed in id. at 921.
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(2) It will prevent a great many treaty provisions from
being self-executing. They will not become "the supreme Law
of the Land" and bind our courts unless and until Congress fol-
lows up the particular treaty by a statute enacted in the ordinary
way by both Houses and signed by the President. 18
(3) Such a statute will be unconstitutional unless it could
be validly passed by Congress under its domestic powers, just
as if there had been no treaty. Consequently any treaty provi-
sion going beyond those domestic powers can be practically
nullified by any state whose law violates the promises made by
the United States in the treaty.
Senator Bricker's draft contains substantially everything in
the first and second parts of the bar association draft; Section 1
corresponds to (1) of the A.B.A. draft, and Section 3 to (2).
However, the Bricker draft omits the third part of the A.B.A.
draft, and (apart from the special situation in Section 2) it
allows Congress to implement any treaty validly by legislation
even if Congress goes beyond its domestic powers. In this respect,
the Bricker proposal makes a less drastic change from our long-
established constitutional law.
14
The Bricker draft adds two features which are not in the
A.B.A. draft. I do not intend to discuss these, and shall merely
state their nature briefly.
In the first place, Sections 114a and 2 outlaw special classes
of treaties, no matter if they are followed by an act of Congress.
Section 2 would block participation by the United States in the
UN Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court.' 5 This
13. This, like the Bricker draft, really strikes out all the words about
treaties from the supremacy clause in Article VI. The clause might as well
begin: "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Law of the Land .. " A
treaty will not be "Law of the Land" at all, but only the implementing statute
(if passed); and this statute falls within the phrase "Laws of the United
States" like any other act of Congress.
14. For example, the Bricker draft would not wipe out Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); the ABA draft would.
14a. Several ambiguities in Section 1 are analyzed in a valuable discussion
of the whole Bricker draft. Association of the Bar of the City of, New York:
Committee on Federal Legislation and Committee on International Law,
Report on Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment . . . Relative to the
Making of Treaties .... 7-10 (1952).
15. The text of this is in 46 Am. J. Internat. Law, Supplement of Official
Documents 1 (1952). It is reprinted in Report of American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, 31-42 (Feb-
ruary 1, 1952). Wright, Proposal for an International Criminal Court, 46
Am. J. Internat. Law 60 (1952), thinks the Draft Statute does not go far
enough.
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document was drafted in Geneva in 1951 by a UN committee
under the chairmanship of George Maurice Morris, a former
President of the American Bar Association. One of its advan-
tages would be that an American newspaper correspondent in
the position of Mr. Oatis in Prague could, if charged with foment-
ing civil strife in the country where he was working, be tried
by an impartial international tribunal and not in a court of
that country, which is liable to be prejudiced against him. This
document is opposed by the Peace and Law Committee,16 and
would undoubtedly be invalidated, along with many other
treaties, by the third part of the A.B.A. draft.
The other added feature of the Bricker draft is Section 4,
which limits the scope of executive agreements. These lie out-
side my province.' It is important, however, to remember that
if executive agreements made by the President alone are to
become much more difficult, the need to cover the same subject
matter by treaties ratified by the Senate will be correspondingly
increased. In that event, there is all the more reason not to
cripple treaties.
It is not easy to deal with two different drafts at the same
"time ,without being dull and confusing the reader. In order to
avoid this as much as possible, I shall direct my main discussion
in the text to the bar association draft and make considerable
use of footnotes to deal with the Bricker draft, when its effect
diverges or otherwise calls for attention.
TREATIES Now SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
The first part of both drafts need not detain us long. It is
unobjectionable in itself, but unnecessary. It just states expressly
what by well-supported interpretation is already in the Consti-
tution.'8 The fact that Article VI brackets treaties with the
Constitution as "the supreme Law of the Land" does not mean
that they are both on the same level. Acts of Congress are
"supreme Law" too, and yet everybody knows they are on a
lower level than the Constitution. For purposes of binding our
16. Report cited supra note 15, pp. 18-21. The Draft Statute is also
thought to go too far by Finch, Editorial Comment, 46 Am. J. Internat. Law
89 (1952).
17. See McClure, International Executive Agreements (1941). Hudson,
Some Problems Under Discussion, address to be published in Proceedings of
the American Society of International Law for 1952; Report cited supra note
14a, at 29-38.
18. This point is fully discussed in Chafee, Federal and State Powers
under the UN Covenant on Human Rights, 1951 Wis. L. Rev. 389, 429-472.
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courts, et cetera, treaties stand no higher than acts of Congress.
A treaty can be subsequently overriden by a federal statute, as
was held in the Head Money cases in 1884,1" the Chinese Exclu-
sion case in 1889,20 and several later decisions.21 When a treaty
can be knocked out by a statute, it is certainly not so good as the
Constitution, which no statute can contravene. The debates at
Philadelphia plainly show that the purpose of this part of Article
VI was to make the three main types of federal laws "supreme"
over state laws and constitutions, and not to rank them inter se.
The description of treaties as "made under the Authority of
the United States" was inserted so as to cover treaties during
the Confederation (infra note 78). It was obviously impossible
to apply to these past treaties the phrase about "made in Pursu-
ance" of the Constitution, which was used for "Laws of the
United States." The debates supply no evidence that the differ-
ence in phraseology meant to the framers that future treaties
should not be subject to constitutional prohibitions.,
No doubt, the question whether the treaty power is subject
to constitutional limitations has never been squarely decided by
the Supreme Court, because fortunately no American treaty
with a foreign nation has come near enough to violating the
Constitution to make the issue worth litigating.22 However, two
19. 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). Mr. Justice Miller said: "A treaty, then is a
law of the land as an act of Congress is.... But ... there is nothing in
this law which makes it irrepealable or unchangeable. The Constitution
gives it no superiority over an act of Congress in this respect, which may
be repealed or modified by an act of a later date....
"In short, . . . so far as a treaty made by the United States . . . can
become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is
subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification,
or repeal." (Id. at 598.)
20. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
21. The authorities are collected in 5 Hackworth, Digest of International
Law 185-198 (1940). In the course of an interesting opinion in Taylor v.
Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784, 785-786 (1855), Mr. Justice Curtis said on circuit:
"There is .. .nothing in the mere fact that a treaty is a law, which would
prevent Congress from repealing it .... If by the Act in question they have
... departed from the treaty, their Act is the municipal law of the country.
... " The point was not discussed when the decision was affirmed in 67 U.S.
481 (1862).
22. The case closest to the issue is Milliken v. Stone, 16 F. 2d 981 (2d Cir.
1927), where individuals sued the attorney general, asserting that the
Eighteenth Amendment was violated by our treaty of 1924 with Great Britain,
allowing British Cunard Lines to bring liquor into American ports under
seal. The bill was dismissed because the plaintiffs had no locus standi.
The possibility that some treaties with the Chippewa Indians presented
the issue was considered in United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926).
Mr. Justice Van Devanter said: "The decisions of this Court generally have
regarded treaties as on much the same plane as acts of Congress, and as
usually subject to the general limitations in the Constitution ... " Id. at 208.
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of the most distinguished men on the Court have made clean-cut
statements on the matter. About sixty years ago, Mr. Justice
Field said in Geofroy v. Riggs23 that the treaty power in the
Constitution is limited "by those restraints which are found in
that instrument against the action of the government or of its
departments, and those arising from the nature of the govern-
ment itself and of that of the States." He repudiated any con-
tention that the treaty power authorizes "what the Constitution
forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in
that of one of the states. . . ." And about twenty years ago,
shortly before Charles Evans Hughes became chief justice, he
told the American Society of International Law 24 that the nation
would not have the power to make an agreement if there were
"some express prohibition in the Constitution" against it, or if
the treaty were intended "to make laws for the people of the
United States in their local concerns ... "
The Supreme Court has never said anything since these two
statements which shows the slightest inclination to repudiate
them. The Migratory Bird case,2 5 although frequently invoked
by the supporters of the proposed amendment, flatly denies that
either the treaty or the implementing act of Congress "conflicts
with any provision of the Constitution!' (to quote the A.B.A. pro-
posal). Mr. Justice Holmes refused "to imply that there are no
qualifications to the treaty-making power" and no express pro-
hibition in the Constitution was involved in the case. The deci-
sion did concern the Tenth Amendment, and this was squarely
held not to be violated but to authorize what the national govern-
ment had done. The true point decided by this case was that the
powers "delegated to the United States" in foreign affairs are
much wider than those so delegated for domestic purposes, and
the powers "reserved to the States" are correspondingly much
smaller; therefore, this extensive area of national control over
dealings with other countries validated, not only treaties them-
selves (as had been repeatedly held for more than a century),26
He then held that the treaties could be construed so as not to conflict with
the Constitution. The case is discussed in Chafee, supra note 18, at 435-436,
and in Cowles, Treaties and Constitutional Law 251-252 (1941).
23. 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
24. Proc.,Am. Soc. of Internat. Law 195-196 (1929).
25. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), discussed at length in Chafee,
supra note 18, at 429-436.
26. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796), discussed infra note 31, and many
later cases. See Chafee, supra note 18, at 429-430.
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but also acts of Congress passed to carry out the, promises in
treaties.
In short, Field, Hughes, and Holmes all stress the vital dis-
tinction which the Constitution makes between the relations of
nation and states for domestic affairs and their relations with
regard to the subject-matter of a treaty. Contrast the third part
of the proposed A.B.A. amendment, which would make federal-
state relations coextensive in these two very different realms.2 7
Later I shall return to this vital distinction and develop it more
adequately.
Whereas the first part of each draft for the suggested amend-
ment does not alter our existing constitutional law, the remainder
of both drafts will certainly bring about very substantial changes.
The nature of each change will now be made clear by comparing
the present operation of the treaty power with the way the pro-
posals would work.
SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES COMPARED WITH COMPULSORY
IMPLEMENTATION BY ACT OF CONGRESS
The most far-reaching part of the A.B.A. proposal consists
of the words, "A treaty shall become effective as internal law of
the United States only through legislation by Congress ... "
Equally disruptive of the way treaties have operated for a hun-
dred and sixty years is Section 3 of the Bricker proposal, which
forbids a treaty to alter federal laws or a state's constitution or
laws "unless, and then only to the extent that, Congress shall so
provide by Act or joint resolution."
Either draft will wipe out our existing constitutional prin-
ciple, by which most American treaties are self-executing. In
order to understand this word, it must be remembered that there
are two aspects to the binding effect of a treaty. In the first place,
it becomes internationally binding after the performance of cer-
tain acts-in this country, signing by the executive and its
ratification by two-thirds of the senators present. After these
acts, the good faith of our government is pledged to the per-
formance of the treaty. A violation of it by our government may
lead to diplomatic remonstrances by the other nation involved,
and possibly to stronger measures or to a proceeding before an
international tribunal. This aspect of creating international obli-
gations is true of all treaties in all countries. Secondly, a good
27. The Bricker draft does not contain this provision.
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many treaties are intended to become binding upon the officials
and private citizens of the nations signing it. In order to have
effective performance of this aspect of a treaty, it needs to be
enforceable in the ordinary courts in the same way as regular
statutes. This domestic effect of a treaty does not inevitably
accompany its creation of international duties. For example, some
treaty provisions may not call for judicial proceedings at all, for
example, our promise to pay Spain for giving up the Philippines.
Still, many provisions do need to "become effective as internal
law," for example when the citizens of each nation are given
reciprocal rights to travel and reside in the other nation. Al-
though in Great Britain the courts will pay no attention to such
a provision until it is implemented by act of Parliament, 28 the
American situation is quite otherwise. Because Article VI makes
the treaty "the supreme Law of the Land" and renders it binding
on every state judge, the treaty will usually take effect auto-
matically in the United States. No act of Congress is required
to implement it, except on rare occasions when express language
in the treaty may require such implementation.2 9
As an example of this self-execution under Article VI, take
the treaty which had the greatest importance for the men who
framed that article-our treaty of peace with Great Britain in
.1783. This treaty agrees "that creditors on either side shall meet
with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in
sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted." 3O
Congress did not pass any statute to implement this promise.
Within a few years, after the Constitution went into force, a
British creditor tried to collect a debt owed him by a Virginian.
The lower court denied relief because a Virginia statute of 1777
had confiscated such debts. Thereupon the Supreme Court, in
28. Infra p. 377 et seq.; Walker v. Baird (1892) A.C. 491 (J.C.), discussed in
Chafee, Legal Problems of Freedom of Information in the United Nations,
14 L. & Contemp. Prob. 545, 559 (1949).
29. That express language in a United States treaty may prevent it from
being self-executing was held by Chief Justice Marshall in Foster v. Neilson,
27 U.S. 253 (1829). This and, other cases to the same effect are discussed in
Chafee, supra note 28, at 558-565, and Chafee, supra note 18, at 395-399.
In both articles, the writer, agrees with our state department that the
International Covenant on Human Rights should not be self-executing in the
United States, and that this result can be accomplished by appropriate lan-
guage in the Covenant.
The United Nations Charter was recently held not to be self-executing
by the Supreme Court of California. State v. Sei Fujii, 38 Cal. Adv. Rep. 817
(April 17, 1952). This nullified an erroneous decision to the contrary by the
lower court, which was greatly relied on by the ABA Committee on Peace
and Law Through United Nations and by Senator Bricker.
30. 24 Journals of the Continental Congress 248 (Washington 1928).
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Ware v. Hytton,3 1 gave the British creditor his money because
the treaty was law and kept the contrary state statute from
being law.
Now, let us suppose that the language proposed by members
of the American Bar Association 2 had been part of Article VI of
the original Constitution. The collection of private debts was
certainly a matter of "internal law," and hence when Congress
did nothing, the Supreme Court would have been helpless to
aid the British creditor. The treaty with Great Britain would
have been flatly violated, and grave reprisals on the part of the
British might well have followed. Yet under the Constitution
as its wise framers wrote it, the British creditor was satisfied,
and probably many more like him were paid voluntarily, now
that litigation was seen to be useless. Thus the renewal of com-
mercial relations between the two countries was encouraged.
The reply may be made that President Washington could
have gone to Congress for the legislation made indispensable by
the suggested amendment. But would he have got it? Senators
and representatives from states whose citizens owed large sums
to our former enemies would have fought tooth and nail against
the enactnment of such a law.
The ability of the President and the Senate to make treaties
does not amount to much unless accompanied by national power
to get those treaties faithfully carried out. That power to stand
firmly behind our international agreements will be gravely im-
paired if the self-executing operation of treaty provisions affect-
ing states and private citizens is abolished and an act of Con-
gress is the only way to prevent them from flouting our promises
to other nations. Even when such provisions happen to fall within
the domestic powers of Congress, the good faith of our nation is
much more likely to be tarnished under the proposed amendment
than under the Constitution as it was written in 1787. During
whatever interval elapses between ratification of the treaty by
the Senate and the day when both Houses of Congress consent
to pass an implementing act, if they ever do, private citizens will
be able to violate the treaty with impunity, state legislatures can
pass statutes ignoring its terms, state judges must brush the
treaty aside as of no concern of theirs, and the nation to which
31. 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
32. If the Bricker draft be substituted in this hypothesis, the effects will
be the same.
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we gave our solemn promises can hold us up to scorn as contract-
breakers and deny our citizens any of the treaty benefits in its
own territory. A bargain which is ignored by one side is not
going to be observed very long by the other side. And the next
time we have some important question to settle with that nation
and seek to open negotiations for a treaty, we are unlikely to
get very far.
THE PRESENT TREATY POWER, CAPABLE OF DEALING EFFECTIVELY
WITH ALL SUBJECTS WHICH CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS, COMPARED WITH THE LIMITATION OF TREATY
ENFORCEMENT TO THE JURISDICTION OF CONGRESS
OVER PURELY DOMESTIC MATTERS
After the second part of the proposed A.B.A. amendment
has made an act of Congress indispensable to enforce the kind of
treaty provisions which are most likely to be violated, the third
and final part refuses to let Congress pass such an act in many
situations where it would be badly needed.33 Congress will not
be able to do more to carry out a treaty than it could do anyway
under the domestic clauses of the Constitution.
Contrast the present situation with that under the bar asso-
ciation proposal. Any question as to the validity of implement-
ing statutes arises very rarely now, because (as already shown)
the self-executing character of our treaties usually makes such
implementing legislation unnecessary. Once in a long while,
however, an American treaty does call for an act of Congress
affecting states and private citizens. The outstanding example
is the migratory bird treaty of 1916 with Great Britain, then
acting on behalf of Canada.3 4 This could not easily have been
self-executing because its enforcement required new federal
criminal laws to punish hunters who killed migratory birds out
of season. Consequently, it agreed that the two nations would
"take, or propose to the respective appropriate law-making bodies,
the necessary measures" for insuring observance of the treaty.
Congress did pass such legislation soon afterwards.3 5 There was
a good deal of doubt whether it could validly do so under the
commerce clause. But with the treaty, the Supreme Court held
33. As already stated in the text, in my analysis of the two drafts (supra
p. 351 et seq.), there is no corresponding provision in the Bricker draft, except
for the prohibition of special classes of treaties in Sections 1 and 2.
34. 39 Stat. 1702, Art. VIII (1916), 16 U.S.C.A. § 703 (1941).
35. Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703-711 (1941).
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(in the decision already discussed)3 6 that this issue of domestic
constitutional law became irrelevant. A great many cases had
already decided that self-executing treaties could deal constitu-
tionally with matters which belonged to the states so far as
domestic law was concerned, such as title to land, the statute
of limitations, local taxation, and regulations as to who could
engage in particular occupations.3 7 The Migratory Bird case
simply applied the same principle to a treaty which was not
self-executing. The constitutional scope of treaties is virtually
as wide as the realm of foreign affairs, subject to the limitations
already quoted from Field and Hughes; and the scope of federal
laws enforcing treaties is correspondingly wide. If the nation
could make the treaty at all, then it ought to be carried out
effectively. Obviously, it was impossible to rely on the chance
that every state over which the birds flew would pass game laws
to comply with the treaty. Enforcement had to be by the nation
or not at all.
The proposed amendment would have caused the case to go
the other way, unless the Supreme Court had strained itself to
make flying birds interstate and foreign commerce, or owned by
the nation like radio bands. Lawyers who consider the extinc-
tion of several species of birds no great loss ought to be dis-
turbed by the danger that the proposal will take away effective
treaty protection from many rights of private property.
Let me illustrate this danger from another treaty which
was well known to the framers of the supremacy clause. The
treaty of alliance with France in 177838 entitled Americans in
France to dispose of their land and goods by will with complete
freedom and also to let their property descend by intestate suc-
cession to persons residing in France or elsewhere, without having
these privileges impeded under pretext of any rights of local
governments or private persons; and French subjects were to
enjoy in the United States "an entire and perfect reciprocity"
relative to the same matters. The right of Frenchmen to inherit
land in several states which then had statutes forbidding all
foreigners to own land was certainly a matter of "internal law,"
and the second part of the A.13.A. proposal would have required
an act of Congress to make the treaty "become effective." Yet
36. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), supra note 25.
37. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796). See Chafee, supra note 18, at
429-430.
38. 11 Journals of the Continental Congress 429 (Washington, 1908).
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if Congress had passed such a statute, the third part of the same
proposal would have made it invalid. Nothing in the Constitution
outside the treaty clauses gives Congress any power to determine
who shall inherit land inside a state. Consequently, if a French-
man had been left by will a plantation in Virginia, a state statute
would have kept him out of the land, and our national govern-
ment would have been helpless to do anything whatever about
it. Before long, the French government would have gone back
on its side of the treaty and refused to let Americans inherit
property in France.
Contrast what actually happened in Virginia under the
supremacy clause as the framers wrote it. The first important
treaty made after the Constitution was the famous Jay treaty
with Great Britain in 1794.39 Samuel E. Morison calls Washing-
ton's determined effort in getting it ratified "one of his wisest
and bravest acts in a life filled with wisdom and courage." 40 An
article of this treaty agreed that British subjects now holding
lands in the United States and American citizens now holding
lands in the British Empire "shall continue to hold them accord-
ing to the nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles
therein, and may grant, sell or devise the same to whom they
please, in like manner as if they were natives.... ." Without any
act of Congress, this treaty provision was given automatic effect
by the Supreme Court so as to override a Virginia statute to the
contrary.41
Imagine what states would have done to the Jay treaty if
the proposed constitutional amendment had been in force. Since
the ownership of land was surely "internal law," this treaty could
not have "become effective" as internal law without an act of
Congress. "While the treaty was still before the Senate in secret
executive session, the terms of it leaked out, and a howl of
execration went up from one end of the country to the other." 42
A bare two-thirds in the Senate was obtained with the greatest
difficulty. If it had been necessary to start all over again after
ratification and push a comprehensive implementing statute
through, both Houses, the hostility to the treaty in the House of
Representatives would have made the enactment of such an elab-
39. 8 Stat. 116 (1794).
40. 1 Morison, Oxford History of the United States 176 (1927).
41. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603, 627 (1813).
42. 1 Morison, op. cit. supra note 40, at 175.
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orate law almost impossible.48 And even if it had somehow
squeezed through Congress, the third part of the A.B.A. proposal
would have made the act unconstitutional.4 4 Obviously Congress
could not regulate the ownership of lands in a state "under its
delegated power in the absence of such treaty." Therefore, this
treaty would have been defied by state after state with impunity.
The British would have been embittered, and Washington's
efforts to restore essential commercial relations with the mother
country would have been futile. British anger would have prob-
ably led to their total repudiation of the Jay treaty and our
consequent loss of the many kinds of advantages which our
nation obtained thereby.
To generalize about the third part of the bar association
proposal, it cripples the power of the United States to perform
promises to other nations in many matters which have cus-
tomarily been covered by treaties. All sorts of controversial
questions about owning and inheriting land, doing business, the
protection of property rights in the courts, et cetera, which are
reserved to the states for purely domestic purposes, have been
put into treaties whenever they were involved in our relations
with foreign countries and their citizens. One strong and frequent
reason for the insertion of such matters in treaties is the desir-
ability of obtaining reciprocal privileges abroad for American
citizens who may reside in the nation with which we are bar-
gaining or who may wish to carry on business there. These are
the very matters in which local disobedience to a treaty is most
likely to occur. If this proposal should prevail and provisions on
these matters should be invalidated, it would be very hard to
stop such disobedience by states or their citizens. We shall be
back in the muddle which existed under the Articles of Con-
federation. The only way, under this A.B.A. amendment, to
obtain nation-wide compliance with a treaty going beyond the
domestic powers of Congress, would be for the administration to
persuade every one of the forty-eight states to shape its laws
voluntarily so as to carry out the treaty. This is a burdensome
and well-nigh hopeless task.
Under the Constitution as it stands, the impact of a treaty
upon the relations between our federal government and our
43. Even a simple bill to appropriate money for mixed commissions to
settle boundaries and claims just got through the House. 1 Morison, loc. cit.
supra note 40.
44. The Bricker draft would not have had this effect, but would have
caused the same difficulties about getting an implementing statute.
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states can be decided by considerations of policy and wisdom.
The negotiators, the President, and the Senate can balance the
good of the whole nation against the interests of particular states,
which (as the framers foresaw) would be vigorously asserted by
senators from those states during the debates on ratifying the
treaty.45 After this balancing is over and the Senate has ratified
the treaty, everything is settled-the treaty is "Law of the Land."
No problems of enforceability remain except in the rare situa-
tions where the treaty is not self-executing.
The A.B.A. proposal would vastly complicate this process.
It would inject difficult questions of constitutional law into the
consideration of treaty after treaty. The disputes and the neces-
sity of overcoming obstacles might drag out for years after rati-
fication-in the House of Representatives when the essential bill
to implement the treaty was before it, in the Senate a second
time, and finally (if this bill should be enacted) in lengthy liti-
gation up to the Supreme Court to determine whether Congress
had exceeded the domestic powers.
Probably the failure of Congress to pass enforcing legisla-
tion would render more treaty provisions ineffective than court
action under the third part of the bar association draft. What
Congress can "enact under its delegated powers in the absence
of [a] treaty" is now closer to what it can do with'a treaty than
it was at an earlier period. The Fourteenth Amendment in 1868
greatly extended the domestic powers of Congress over affairs
inside the states. Since 1937, they have been extended still fur-
ther by the inclination of the Supreme Court to give a very wide
scope to the commerce clause and its reluctance to declare any
act of Congress unconstitutional. Moreover, if the only way for
the Supreme Court to ensure the enforcement of a desirable
treaty provision is to make it fall within the domestic powers of
Congress, then the Court might be impelled to stretch the com-
merce clause or the due process clause enough to hold that the
implementing statute could be validly enacted without a treaty.
Thus an amendment making the treaty powers co-extensive with
45. For example, when it was objected in the North Carolina ratifying
convention that treaties ought to be approved by both Houses of Congress,
Richard D. Spaight (a member of the Philadelphia Convention) replied:
.. . that it was thought better to put that power into the hands of the
senators as representatives of the states; that thereby the interest of every
state was equally attended to irn the formation of treaties .... " 4 Elliot's
Debates 56 (2 ed. 1836), reprinted in 3 Farrand, Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, 342 (1911).
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the domestic powers in order to narrow the former might actually
result in widening the latter. The truth is that nobody can fore-
see how the third part of the bar association proposal would work,
except that its interpretation by the courts would surely cause
a great deal of uncertainty and trouble in connection with many
treaties which have nothing to do with the United Nations.
CONTEMPORANEOUS EXAMPLES OF THE EFFECT
OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
The foregoing discussion has shown that an amendment
wiping out the self-executing operation of our treaties would
gravely interfere with the performance of treaty promises made
by the United States whose desirability is recognized by virtually
everybody. And further, that the damage would be still greater
if, as in the bar association draft, the enforcement of many
familiar types of treaty provisions were rendered unconstitu-
tional.
For 'purposes of illustration I have used our three chief
treaties between 1776 and 1800. Of course some of their features
may not recur in our outstanding and future treaties, but it is
just as important as it ever was to keep the treaty powers wide
and flexible in order to cover the great range of matters which
may call for international action and whose precise nature cannot
be known when treaty clauses are put into the Constitution. The
A.B.A. draft or the Bricker draft would have been bad in 1787,
and they would be similarly injurious to many valuable provi-
sions commonly inserted in twentieth century treaties.
Thus we have over fifty treaties now in force relating to
reciprocal inheritance rights46 and about a hundred extradition
treaties. If the suggested amendment is retroactive, which is
not made plain in either draft, an enormous amount of congres-
sional legislation would have to be passed to preserve the bind-
ing effect of these treaties, and the A.B.A. draft would create
serious doubts as to the validity of much of this legislation, insofar
as the treaties apply to land in states, to proceedings in state
courts for the extradition of persons wanted for crimes abroad,
and to requests by state governments for the extradition of per-
sons 'found abroad who are wanted for prosecution by the states.
Treaty provisions for non-discriminatory taxation of aliens would
seem invalid under the A.B.A. draft insofar as state taxation is
46. These are listed in the government's brief in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503 (1947).
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concerned. Provisions assuring nationals of the signatory foreign
nations equal and non-discriminatory access to our courts would
be impeded or nullified, because it is hard to see how Congress
under its domestic powers could regulate suits in state courts.
Remember that many suits involving aliens are not brought in
the federal courts, and some of them must be in state courts
because of lack of the jurisdictional amount of $3000. Provisions
forbidding discrimination against aliens in carrying on occupa-
tions would be hindered or upset. A commercial transaction in
which a foreigner engages is not necessarily foreign commerce,
for example, a restaurant run by an unnaturalized Greek in any
American city.
If the suggested amendment is not going to apply to treaties
now in force, the difficulties just described will all apply to
future treaties of the same kinds. For years to come we shall
have one sort of constitutional law for old treaties before the
amendment and another sort for new treaties-a very confusing
situation for everybody. Moreover, the practical effect of the
amendment upon negotiations for commercial treaties might be
bad, because foreign governments would soon see that any agree-
ment negotiated with the executive and ratified by the Senate
would still have to run the gauntlet of both Houses, in either
of which the essential implementing statute could be stifled in
committee or killed by a well-organized minority.
Very important treaties of a specialized sort would be gravely
impeded. Atomic energy, especially in non-military uses, would
be harder to control internationally. This is not the place to go
into details, but the proposed amendment is causing much anxi-
ety on this account. The amendment would also have some
detrimental effect upon the ability of the United States to nego-
tiate and carry out commercial aviation treaties. For example,
the pending revision of the Rome Convention 47 involves ques-
tions of the limitation of liability of foreign operators causing
damage in the United States, rules limiting jurisdiction of the
courts to entertain damage suits in relation thereto, and insur-
ance requirements for foreign aircraft operators. Such a civil
aviation treaty can now take effect as soon as it is ratified, but
under either the A.B.A. or Bricker draft it would have to be
followed by an elaborate act of Congress.
48
47. Hudson, International Legislation 327, 334 (1937), both opened for
signature May 29, 1933.
48. Such an act would probably be valid under the commerce clause,
1952]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
How OUR 1948 COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH ITALY WOULD
BE AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Since some readers may wish to get a detailed understanding
of a specific treaty as affected by the suggested amendment, I set
forth one recent example-the treaty of friendship, commerce,
and navigation, which we concluded with Italy in 1948 and the
Senate ratified in 1949.49 Although the amendment, unless retro-
active, would not apply to this treaty, it is typical of the sort of
commercial treaty which we are likely to make with other coun-
tries in the future. Many of its most valuable provisions furnish
reciprocal protection to property rights. They certainly relate
to "internal law" and so would have to be implemented by Con-
gress under either the A.B.A. or the Bricker draft. As the reader
goes through each successive article, he can consider two ques-'
tions: (a) The difficulties of enacting the essential legislation
to make its provisions binding in the United States. (b) The
extent to which the protection given Italian citizens by the article
would probably be unconstitutional under the A.B.A. draft. Is it
doubtful whether the particular provision corresponds to any
express power conferred on Congress by Article I, Section 8, or
some other part of the Constitution? Could Congress enact
such a law "in the absence of [a] treaty?"
Article I entitles the nationals of either party "to engage in
commercial, manufacturing, processing, financial, scientific, edu-
cational, religious, philanthropic and professional activities except
the practice of law . . ."; to own or rent land and buildings for
residential, commercial, religious and other professions; and to
choose their own employees regardless of nationality.
Article II entitles American corporations in Italy to exercise
all these same privileges on the same favorable terms as Italian
corporations, and gives reciprocal privileges to Italian corpora-
tions to do business in the United States. This last provision
"shall be construed as according such rights and privileges in
any state. ;. of the United States... , upon terms no less favor-
able than those upon which such rights and privileges are or may
be accorded therein to corporations . . . created or organized in
other states ... of the United States ... ." By Article III, Ameri-
cans can organize Italian corporations, hold stock and offices in
but the dtfficulty of drafting and enacting it would be a serious obstacle to
the effectiveness of the civil aviation treaty.
49. Dept. of State Pub. 3642, Treaties and other International Acts Series
1965 (1950).
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them, et cetera, and vice versa. Italian corporations controlled
by Americans can engage in Italy in "commercial, manufactur-
ing, processing, mining, educational, philanthropic, religious and
scientific activities" on the same terms as other Italian corpora-
tions; and American corporations controlled by Italians can
similarly carry on these activities in the United States. -
Article IV allows citizens and corporations of either country
"to explore for and exploit mineral resources" in the other coun-
try upon a most favored nation basis.
Article V entitles the nationals of each nation to receive "the
most constant protection and security" for their persons and
for individual or corporate property in the other's territories.
All sorts of rights in criminal and civil proceedings are then
specified, and these of course affect state courts. By Article VI
dwellings, warehouses, shops, et cetera, are not to be subject to
unlawful entry or molestation, and permissible searches or
inspections are to be conducted "so as to cause the least possible
interference" with the occupants or the ordinary conduct of
business.
Article VI deals fully with reciprocal rights to own and
dispose of land, personal property, et cetera, in the other coun-
try. Article VII mutually protects patents, trade marks, and
other industrial property. Article IX prevents internal taxes of
any sort which are more burdensome than those imposed upon
citizens and domestic corporations. Article X protects the entry
and sojourn of commercial travelers.
The most precious human rights are covered by Article XI-
liberty of conscience and freedom of worship, such as the conduct
of services in appropriate buildings "without annoyance or
molestation of any kind" by reason of religious belief; and free-
dom of the press and free interchange of information, including
freedom of transmission of press material, motion pictures, et
cetera, to be used abroad, and freedom of publication in the
other country on the same terms as its citizens.
There are a great many more reciprocal privileges given, but
enough has been said to show the great need for this treaty,
and the numerous similar treaties which have been or will be
made with other countries to "become effective as internal law."
Under the Constitution of 1787, this happened automatically to
the Italian treaty, and inconsistent state statutes were immedi-
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ately nullified. If the proposed amendment were in force, the
President would have to go to great trouble and delay before he
got the necessary act of Congress covering all the complex
treaty promises, and he might not succeed at all. Even if he
did, part of the act would surely be unconstitutional under the
bar association proposal. For instance, the purely domestic pow-
ers of Congress do not include the right of an Italian citizen to
practice medicine in a state, not at least when the state laws
exclude all foreigners from being doctors.
THE STRONG REASONS OF THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION OF 1787
FOR INSERTING THE PRESENT Two TREATY CLAUSES
IN THE CONSTITUTION
Having thus described the changes which the proposed
amendment would make in our present constitutional law, I next
turn to a broader subject-the reasons of the Philadelphia Con-
vention for inserting the present two treaty clauses in the Con-
stitution. With the exception of the compromise between large
and small states through equal representation in the Senate and
the method of electing the president, no subject probably received
more attention from the Convention than treaties. The treaty-
making power was at first given to the Senate alone. Then some
wanted it to be in the President alone. After the combination of
both was arranged, there was considerable controversy about
the two-thirds vote, especially for a treaty of peace, since a minor-
ity of the Senate might thereby be able to perpetuate a war. The
supremacy clause had its start on the very first day that the
Convention got down to real business,5 ° and during three months
it came up again and again in different forms until it took final
shape. Instead of going into details, I shall present four features
of the treaty power which the debates show the Convention to
have had very much at heart while they framed these two
clauses.
First, the scope of the treaty power should be very wide,
as wide as the necessities of international intercourse, of which
these statesmen were fully aware. The vital distinction between
foreign affairs and domestic matters was taken for granted
throughout. Indeed, this distinction was ingrained in their minds
long before they met in Philadelphia. It did not begin with the
Constitution-it was an outstanding feature of the Articles of
50. 1 Farrand, op. cit. supra note 45, at 18. This work is hereafter cited
as Farrahd.
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Confederation. In domestic affairs, apart from the management
of war and military matters generally, the Articles made the
states everything and the Continental Congress almost nothing.
It could not even levy taxes, but merely recommend them to the
state legislatures. Its only exclusive peace powers were to coin
money, fix weights and measures, regulate Indian affairs, and
operate post offices. The states could do the rest. In foreign
affairs, by contrast, the states were nothing and the Continental
Congress was everything. Congress had "the sole and exclusive
right and power . . . of sending the receiving ambassadors-
entering into treaties and alliances... .." r On the other hand, "No
state without the Consent of the united states in Congress assem-
bled, shall send any embassies to, or receive any embassies, or
enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any
King, prince or state .... ,, 52 Of this latter provision Madison
wrote in The Federalist (No. 44) that "for reasons which need no
explanation, [it] is copied into the new Constitution." r3 At the
same time, the exclusive national power to make treaties was
continued, but was transferred from the whole of Congress to
the President and the Senate.
Because of the vital distinction between foreign affairs and
domestic matters, the extent of federal power over the latter was
considered as an entirely separate subject from treaties. Nobody
in the published debates ever suggested that the scope of the
treaty power of the nation should be cut -down to the domestic
powers of Congress. Throughout it was assumed that the United
States ought to possess the same capacities to enter into inter-
national arrangements as did the other civilized nations with
which we might negotiate. The reason is plain why the Consti-
tution enabled the national government to do things in foreign
affairs by treaty which Congress could not do by domestic legis-
lation. In home matters the framers expected that most of the
work of governing Americans would continue to be done by the
states. Specified legislative tasks of national importance would
be assigned to Congress, but state legislatures were to take care
of the rest. Except for a few outrageous things nobody could do
like enacting bills of attainder, everything in domestic matters
51. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, Article IX (ratified
in 1781).
52. Id. at Article VI.
53. The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United
States 277 (ed. by Henry Cabot Lodge 1888). All references to the Federalist
will cite the Lodge edition.
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belonged either to Congress or to the states. Thus somebody
could do whatever law-making needed to be done in a civilized
country-there was no vacuum. But in foreign affairs there were
no comparable two areas of national matters and local matters.
Everything legitimately possible in foreign affairs was of national
importance. Here a vacuum would exist if the federal treaty
power were narrowly limited. The states could not take over.
They were forbidden to conduct negotiations with other nations.54
Consequently, unless the national government could act, nobody
could act. The people of the United States were accustomed to
governing themselves through scores of bodies from town meet-
ings and county commissioners up to Congress, but when it was
a question of bargaining with other nations they had to act as a
unit. The framers knew that they were founding a great nation,
and they wanted it to be able to behave in the world like a great
nation.
Contrast the action of the American Bar Association which,
after a century and a half of international growth which nobody
in Philadelphia could have foreseen, wants to create a No Man's
Land, where neither President, Senate, House, nor Supreme
Court will be able to relieve international tensions by sensible
agreements effectively performed. For the sake of states' rights,
this A.B.A. amendment would deprive the nation of functions
which the states cannot possibly perform.
Secondly, the framers were anxious to guard the nation
against unwise or corrupt treaties and took much pains to do so
adequately. They repeatedly expressed such fears as that the
Senate, if solely empowered, might sell a big slice of territory
or part with the navigation of the Mississippi; 55 or that a Presi-
dent, if acting alone, might make a treaty grossly favoring his
own state, or he might be bribed by another nation to yield
damaging concessions and then flee to the bribing country for
refuge from the indignant vengeance of the American people.56
There was no carelessness about hedging in the treaty power with
54. U.S. Const. Art I, § 10: "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation .... No State shall without the Consent of Congress ...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power ..... "
55. See, for example, George Mason, 2 Farrand 297-298 (August 15), and
Gouverneur Morris, Id. at 548 (September 8).
56. See, for example, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, speaking In the
South Carolina legislature, in 3 Farrand 251 (January 16, 1788).
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proper precautions. The attitude of the framers on this point
was summarized by John Jay in The Federalist (No. 64):57
"The power of making treaties is an important one, espe-
cially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it
should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such
precautions, as will afford the highest security that it will
be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and
in the manner most conducive to the public good. The con-
vention appears to have been attentive to both these points.
And Hamilton wrote in a later issue (No. 75) :58
"The qualities e.lsewhere detailed as indispensable in the
management of foreign negotiations, point out the Executive
as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast
importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws,
plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion
of the legislative body in the office of making them."
Third, on the other'hand, the framers did not want to have it
too hard to conclude treaties. They were not willing to obtain
complete safety from bad treaties by making it virtually impos-
sible to have good treaties. As Jay wrote in The Federalist,9 "Let
us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the con-
tracting parties, but by both." The Conventiori knew that it
would be very difficult for us to conduct satisfactory negotiations
with a nation which was able to turn its positions at the con-
ference into a formal agreement, if the offers of our delegates
were by contrast merely tentative and subject to almost insuper-
able obstacles before ratification was possible. For this reason,
the framers rejected two possible methods of ratification which
were brought up in the Convention as alternatives to the method
eventually adopted of a vote by two-thirds of the senators
present.
One rejected plan was to require two-thirds of all the mem-
bers of the Senate, including those who were absent. Against
this Hamilton wrote in The Federalist (No. 75):1 °
".... all provisions which require more than the majority of
any body to its resolutions, have a direct tendency to embar-
57. Federalist, at 400.
58. Id. at 467.
59. Id. at 405.
60. Id. at 469.
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rass the operations of the government, and an indirect one
to subject the sense of the majority to that of the minority.
This consideration seems sufficient to determine our opin-
ion, that the convention have gone as far in the endeavor to
secure the advantage of numbers in the formation of treaties
as could have been reconciled either with the activity of the
public councils or with a reasonable regard to the major
sense of the community. If two thirds of the whole number
of members had been required, it would, in many cases,
from the non-attendance of a part, amount in practice to a
necessity of unanimity. And the history of every political
establishment in which this principle has prevailed, is a his-
tory of impotence, perplexity, and disorder."
The other plan, which received fuller attention, was to have
the House of Representatives participate in treaties, either in
making them or in passing a required implementing statute (the
method of the A.B.A. and Bricker drafts). On August 23rd
Gouverneur Morris made a motion that no treaty should be
binding on the United States "which is not ratified by a Law."
During the full discussion which followed, much stress was laid
on the practical disadvantages of such a requirement. For
example, it was said that at the conference which negotiated the
treaty, the delegates from the other countries would have definite
instructions how to proceed, but not ours. Previous consultation
with the President and senators would not enable them to know
what course would be approved. If the ultimate power to make
the treaties effective was shared by the House, our negotiators
would have to be instructed by representatives too, and that was
impracticable. Morris's motion was then voted down 8 to 1.61
Two weeks later James Wilson renewed the plan by moving that
treaties had to be approved by both the Senate and the House,
because if "they are to have the operation of laws, they ought to
have the sanction of laws also." He was voted down 10-1.62
Using the House of Representatives was urged by opponents
of the Constitution. In replying, Pierce Butler told the South
Carolina legislature that negotiations always required the greatest
secrecy, which could not be expected in a large body. And
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney also stressed the need for speed
with some treaties. The Senate being a smaller body, could be
61. 2 Farrand 392-394 (August 23).
62. Id. at 538 (September 7).
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called together quickly, but it would be very hard to convene
the House at short notice.63 When a similar objection came up
in the North Carolina Convention, William Richardson Davie
insisted that treaties were not like ordinary statutes and ought
not to be adopted in the same way. "The power of making
treaties has, in all countries and governments, been placed in
the executive departments." This was not only because of the
need of secrecy, planning, and speed, but also to prevent treaties
from "being impeded by the violence, animosity and heat of
parties which too often infect numerous [large] bodies . ," 64
And Hamilton in The Federalist (No. 75) pointed out the draw-
backs of sharing control over treaties with the House: 65
"The fluctuating and, taking its future increase into the
account, the multitudinous composition of that body, forbid
us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the
proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and compre-
hensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic
adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility
to national character; decision, secrecy, and despatch, are
incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so
numerous. The very complication of the business, by intro-
ducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different
bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater
frequency of the calls upon the House of Representatives,
and the greater length of time which it would often be
necessary to keep them together when convened, to obtain
their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty, would be
a source of so great inconvenience and expense as alone
ought to condemn the project."
These reasons against treaties going to the House are very
important in connection with the amendment now under consid-
eration. In substance both drafts of it simply revive the over-
whelmingly defeated motions of Gouverneur Morris and James
Wilson. To require an act of Congress before a treaty can be
made effective is almost the same thing as requiring it to be rati-
fied by the House in the first place. Indeed it is worse in some
ways, because the interval between the customary ratification
by two-thirds of the Senate and the discussion of the implement-
ing legislation in the House will allow plenty of time for fresh
63. 3 Farrand 250-251.
64. Id. at 348.
65. Federalist, at 468-469.
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animosities to gather. The framers were even more anxious that
treaties should not be hard to get enforced after they were rati-
fied than they were to prevent it from being too hard to make
treaties. A broken national promise is a greater blot on our
honor than no promise at all.
Fourth, the framers wanted the national government to be
able to have treaties performed after they were ratified. They
were fully aware that for many treaties this meant having them
"become effective internally" (in the words of the A.B.A. draft).
Compliance by state officials and by citizens of the states had to
be assured. B6th the French treaty of 1778 and the British treaty
of 1783 made this plain to them, and some of their drafts were
even more explicit on this point than the final text of Article VI.
Thus the basic formulation of this article, made by Luther Martin
of Maryland, declared that the legislative acts of, the United
States and all treaties "shall be the supreme law of the respective
States, as far as those.. . Treaties shall relate to the said States,
or their Citizens and Inhabitants ... " This draft was at once
adopted unanimously.66
The Convention was thoroughly satisfied with the fact that
the Articles of Confederation had concentrated the control of
foreign affairs exclusively in the central government. Yet it was
also keenly aware of one damaging defect in this control. This
was that the central government was helpless whenever a state
or its citizens chose to violate treaty provisions. On the very first
day when the Convention got down to the merits, Randolph of
Virginia enumerated the defects of the Confederation, among
which was-"they could not cause infractions of treaties . . . to
be punished." 67 These complaints of state breaches of treaties
kept recurring. Madison, writing years later, said that in every
proceeding of the Convention, from start to finish, the necessity
of "paramountship" of national laws over state laws was taken
for granted: Il
"Every vote in the Journal involving the opinion, proves
a unanimity among the Deputations, on this point.... [The]
necessity of some adequate mode of preventing the States in
their individual characters, from defeating the Constitu-
66. 2 Farrand 22, 28-29 (July 17). Italics supplied.
67. 1 Farrand 19 (May 29).
68. Unsent letter from Madison to John Tyler, written after February 6,
1833, in 3 Farrand 527; letter from Madison to W. C. Rives, October 21, 1833,
id. at 523.
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tional authority of the States in their united character, .. .
had been decided by a past experience. . . [The] radical
defect of the old confederation lay in the power of the States
. .. to disregard or to counteract the authorised .. regula-
tions of Congress."
The only disagreement in the Convention was as to what
should be the remedy against recalcitrant states. Five such reme-
dies were suggesed at various times. (1) Randolph's opening
speech suggested a Council of Revision, composed of the chief
executive and a convenient number of national judges, with
power to examine every national and state law and to veto it.69
(Some early state constitutions had set up such a body.) (2) Two
days later, however, he moved to entrust Congress with the power
to negative all state laws contravening the articles of Union,
which Franklin amended to include "any Treaties subsisting
under the authority of the union." 70 From this motion there was
no dissent. (3) An additional remedy proposed simultaneously
was for Congress to be able to call forth troops against any
offending state,7'1 but this caused controversy. Madison thought
this was like declaring war against the state, and Gerry said
the new system would give the national government the means
to secure itself without this method of armed force.7 2 (4) On
June 15th, Patterson of New Jersey introduced his comprehensive
draft, which included the remedy eventually chosen. Treaties
were to be "the supreme law of the respective States," so far as
they related "to the said States or their Citizens," and to bind
state judges, regardless of state laws to the contrary.78 (5) A
final remedy, suggested by Hamilton soon afterwards, but never
taken seriously, was for the national authority to appoint all the
state governors, who would have power to veto state statutes.7 4
After a month's consideration of remedies (2), (3), and (4)
by the Committee of the Whole, it reported in favor of remedy
(2)-letting Congress negative state laws which contravened
acts of Congress or treaties. The Convention struck this out on
July 17th for fear it would disgust all the states and prevent
their acceptance of the Constitution, 8 and unanimously adopted
69. 1 Farrand 21 (May 29).
70. Id. at 47 (May 31).
71. Id. at 21 (May 29); 47 (May 31); 2 Farrand 182 (report from Committee
on Detail) (August 6).
72. Id. at 54, 61 (May 31).
73. Id. at 245 (June 15).
74. Id. at 293 (June 18).
75. 2 Farrand 27-28 (July 17). The vote was 7-3.
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Luther Martin's proposal (already quoted), which vested the
negative power in the judiciary. 6 A month later, the remedy of
control by armed force was unanimously rejected, because Gou-
verneur Morris said it was superfluous when treaties were going
to be laws, enforceable in the courts.7 7 After some slight altera-
tions, such as leaving no doubt that past treaties made under the
Confederation were included,7 the supremacy clause assumed
its present form.79
The proposed amendment would upset everything the unani-
mous vote on Luther Martin's motion accomplished. Treaties
would be the "supreme Law of the Land" only in words. Most
treaties could not be enforced without the added difficulties of
getting an act of Congress; and under the A.B.A. draft many
treaty provisions could not be enforced at all, although interna-
tional exigencies might make it very desirable to promise more
than what Congress can do under its domestic powers. For
instance, American citizens and corporations might be receiving
valuable corresponding privileges abroad, as in the Italian com-
mercial treaty of 1948.80 Under the proposal, however, the states
will be supreme in this area of foreign affairs, and not the nation.
As Charles Pinckney told the Convention, "if the states were left
to act of themselves ... ,it would be impossible to defend the
national prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper;"
by this means, he went on, foreign treaties had been violated
repeatedly under the Confederation.8 '
OUR TREATY CLAUSES ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO OUR
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
One point which stands out prominently in all the Conven-
tion debates about treaties is the close linkage between problems
of the treaty power and the nature of our federal system. Ques-
tions of how treaties should be concluded and enforced cannot
be viewed in isolation from the rest of the Constitution. They
were constantly tied up in the minds of the framers with ques-
tions about the length of the President's term, the composition of
the Senate, and the proper relation between the states and the
76. Id. at 28-29 (July 17); Federalist, at 468-469.
77. Id. at 389-390 (August 23).
78. Id. at 417 (August 25).
79. Id. at 572 (referred to Committee on Style); id. at 603 (reported by
Committee on Style).
80. Dept. of State Pub. 3642, Treaties and other International Acts Series
1965 (1950).
81. 1 Farrand 164 (June 8).
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nation. Thus the treaty power is part of a seamless web. Sup-
porters of the proposed amendment have made a good deal of the
facts that we are almost the only country on earth where treaties
are self-executing, and that in many other countries both houses
of the national legislature participate in the ratification of treaties.
But what other nations do about treaties has very little signifi-
cance for us, because they do many other related things very
differently from us.
Our whole political system has at least three characteristics
which are intimately connected with the operation of our treaty
power. Some or all of these general characteristics are lacking
in nations whose handling of treaties resembles methods in the
proposed amendment.
(1) Ours is a federal system, in which forty-eight divisions
of the nation have a large amount of sovereignty and do a great
deal of independent law-making. Thus with us there is a big
opportunity for local legislation to conflict with national prom-
ises to other nations. The self-executing operation of treaties is
a badly needed safeguard against such breaches of national good
faith. No such safeguard is needed in a unitary nation like Great
Britain where Parliament is an omnipotent legislature. There,
the national government which makes the treaty is the only
government with the practical ability to enact statutes bearing
on the subject matter of the treaty. Here, forty-eight small sov-
ereigns can do so, and unless they can be effectively restrained,
* our country might be a checkerboard with some states complying
with the treaties and others flouting it. Such an evil can exist
only in a federal system, and the framers made treaties self-
executing because that was the best way to stop this evil, which
had cursed the Confederation.
(2) The national legislature in the United States does partici-
pate to, some extent in the conclusion of treaties, through a two-
thirds vote of the senators present. This is a fair equivalent for
the majority votes in both houses which is necessary in some
countries to ratify the treaty, and in Great Britain to transform
the treaty into domestic law. The British insistence on such
action by Parliament is a natural outgrowth of their constitu-
tional struggles against the Stuart kings. The Crown can make
treaties all by itself, and if treaties so made became the law of
the land without anything more happening, this would enable
the Crown to change domestic law without any participation by
1952]
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Parliament. Such a result would violate the whole principle of
Parliamentary supremacy, which is a main part of the unwritten
British Constitution. When Charles I endeavored to make laws
without Parliament, he lost his head. The Revolution of 1688
took place to make sure that that sort of thing would never
happen again. Domestic law-making through royal treaties is as
abhorrent as royal levying of ship-money or royal suspension of
habeas corpus.
(3) Our country does not have a parliamentary government
like Great Britain. There the necessity of an implementing stat-
ute to make any treaty domestically binding is not a serious
obstacle to its effective enforcement, because the executive is
chosen by the majority of the House of Commons. The Cabinet
and that majority are one at heart. The Cabinet advises the King
to make the treaty, and the Cabinet can count on the Commons
to pass whatever legislation is needed to make the treaty work.
The House of Lords will go along or be whipped into line.
Our President has no such assurance of obtaining a rapid
vote in both Houses of Congress for a statute to implement a
treaty. Sometimes he belongs to the opposite political party.
Still more often, the majority at one or both ends of the Capitol
feels completely free to disregard his wishes. Although two-
thirds of the Senate ratified it, a majority may turn against him
on the statute; and when the majority of the senators is still
with him, there is always the possibility of filibustering to delay
the statute indefinitely. Of course, the House will be still more
uncertain. Remember that several states may be defying the
treaty. Consequently, it would be far more difficult to get a
treaty to become enforceable internally through indispensable
implementing legislation than is the case in England. The British
situation is so different from ours that it has no lessons for us. 82
82. The supporters of the ABA amendment argue that the situation it
would create is comparable to that in Canada, now that the British govern-
ment and Parliament can no longer make and implement treaties for Canada.
Although the Canadian legislature, unlike our Senate, takes no part in mak-
ing treaties, the Parliament in Ottawa must act to make them internal law;
and the Privy Council in London held that its powers for this purpose are
restricted by the rights of the provinces as much as if it were legislating for
purely domestic purposes. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General
for Ontario (1937) A.C. 326 (J.C.). The case involved International Labor
Conventions.
The Canadian situation, however, Is "an example to avoid and not a
model to be imitated." Many Canadian lawyers are greatly disturbed by this
crippling of treaties. For Instance, N.A.M. MacKenzie of the University of
Toronto Law School wrote soon after the decision: "[The] outlook is any-
thing but encouraging to those who are interested in the welfare of Canada
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What matters infinitely more is the wisdom of the Philadelphia
Convention in fitting the treaty power into the federal system so
that the great nation they founded would be able to manage its
foreign affairs effectively.
No NEW FACTS JUSTIFY ABANDONING OUR LONG-
ESTABLISHED OPERATION OF TREATIES
After the plan for treaties set up by the Philadelphia Con-
vention for the strong reasons outlined above has operated with
considerable success for one hundred and sixty years, what new
facts have arisen which ought to lead us to throw overboard
their reasons and their plan? Aside from the existence of differ-
ent treaty methods in nations with very different political systems
from ours, the chief argument advanced seems to be the possibil-
ity that the United States might at some indefinite time become
a party to some treaty emanating from the United Nations, and
that such a treaty might be very harmful to us. UN treaties
now under consideration are denounced for having novel fea-
tures: 83
"At the time the Constitution was adopted and until
recently, treaties were restricted to their traditional field of
agreements . . . imposing duties and obligations on the con-
tracting states. . . . Today, however, treaties are being made
and submitted to the Senate for ratification,84 and others are
'proposed, which impose criminal and civil liabilities directly
on individual citizens.... [The] State Department has under-
taken to negotiate.., extensively with other nations in this
new area, . . .regarding the relationship of a government
with its own citizens."
and ultimately of the provinces. For if the Dominion lacks the power to give
effect to international obligations, and if the prospects of getting provincial
agreement on matters of this kind are remote, there seems no remedy save
that of amending the British North America Act itself; but this is likely
to prove even more difficult of achievement .... [The decision is] unjustified,
as well as being destructive of the Dominion's control over the treaty-
making power and foreign affairs generally." Canada and the Treaty-
making Power, 15 Can. Bar Rev. 436, 452, 454 (1937). See similar regrets
about the present treaty situation in Canada by other Canadian lawyers in
the same volume.
Just because Canada is in a mess is no reason why the United States
should get into the same mess.
83. Report cited supra note 5, at 11-12. I have not reprinted suggestions
that these treaties are contrary to our Bill of Rights or encroach on state
affairs. These are questions which the President and Senate may be trusted
to consider. Ultimately any unconstitutional treaty provision can be nullified
by our courts, as set forth in my discussion, supra p. 353 et seq.
84. Presumably this refers to the Genocide Convention, which the Senate
has had before it for over a year without acting.
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The proper answer to this is that of course new treaties are
bound to have new features. International law has to keep up
with life, which refuses to stand still. Aviation and atomic energy
were unthought of by the framers as subjects for treaties, but
we are thinking about them today. The conception of inter-
national responsibilities upon individuals began with the Nurem-
berg Trials and the Tokyo Trials, in which our government was
a prominent participant. Whether this conception should be
adopted in other international agreements is a question on which
reasonable men differ, but there is nothing so abominable about
it that it ought not to be submitted to the judgment of the Presi-
dent and the Senate, acting under the influence of public opinion,
the same as any other controversial problem of foreign affairs.
Even if we assume that a very bad UN treaty might be
submitted by the United Nations, why do we need a constitu-
tional amendment to protect us from it? If the treaty is bad, past
experience indicates that either the President would not sign it,
or at least thirty-three senators would vote against it. I see no
basis in fact for believing that the Senate, which has been called
the graveyard of treaties, will suddenly nurture treaties like a
crowded incubation ward in a lying-in hospital. The safeguards
set up in Philadelphia against unwise treaties are there as much
as they ever were. If we cannot trust the President to refuse to
sign a harmful treaty and if we cannot trust over two-thirds of
the senators to refrain from ratifying this bad treaty, then the
country will have come to a sorry pass indeed. There will be
little use then in relying upon Supreme Court Justices, who are
chosen by the President and the Senate, to save us through their
interpretation of the proposed constitutional amendment. One
of the few sure maxims of government is that you have to trust
somebody.
AN EXISTING REMEDY, IF TREATIES ACTUALLY RATIFIED ARE LATER
THOUGHT TO BE BAD, RENDERS THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
WHOLLY UNNECESSARY
However, let us suppose that a bad treaty is signed and rati-
fied by the Senate, contrary to all past experience. Then it does
not have to remain "the Law of the Land" forever. The moment
that Congress decides that a treaty is producing evil results, a
majority of both Houses can pass an act ending the internal effect
of this treaty. That is exactly what was done in the Chinese Exclu-
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sion case,85 and it can be done again whenever the need arises. No
doubt, such a repudiation of a treaty is a breach of our good faith,
but so is the failure to make treaties effective at all internally,
which is rendered easy by the suggested amendment. The exist-
ing remedy has the great advantage of being applied only to an
occasional treaty after it has been definitely condemned as bad.
The remedy in the proposed amendment would interfere with the
observance of a great many treaties, whether good or bad.
THE CONSTITUTION OUGHT NOT TO BE AMENDED TO
MEET ONLY CONJECTURAL HARv
At most, the alleged danger from the making of harmful
treaties is only hypothetical. The backers of this proposal do not
point to a single American treaty that was ever ratified, and say,
"This treaty is so bad that it shows the urgent need for changing
the Constitution." They give fears and not facts.
Is "the home of the brave" going to let itself be scared into
changing a hitherto satisfactory part of our fundamental law
because of something that never has happened yet and may
never happen at all? Every constitutional amendment in the
past has been adopted to meet a situation which has actually
happened, and not something which is vaguely apprehended. The
first Ten Amendments were promised in order to prevent the
Constitution from being rejected in several state conventions.
The Eleventh and Sixteenth were adopted'to supersede specific
decisions of the Supreme Court, which were widely regarded as
objectionable. The Twelfth and the Twentieth cured confusing
sitflations which had occurred in the choice of a President and
in the delay between the election of a new President and Con-
gress and their assumption of office. The three Civil War amend-
ments were primarily aimed to end slavery and attempts to treat
the emancipated slaves as second-class citizens; beyond this, the
framers were aware of the desirability of avoiding other types
of arbitrary state action. The Seventeenth Amendment was
meant to remedy unsatisfactory conditions which had plainly
revealed themselves in the legislative election of senators. The
Eighteenth Amendment was aimed at the evils of liquor, and
the Twenty-first was aimed at the evils of prohibition. The Nine-
teenth removed the existing evil of the denial of suffrage to
half the adult population. The latest amendment, forbidding a
85. See notes 19, 20, 21, supra.
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third term, was not proposed until after a President had been
elected for four terms.
Thus far we have adopted every constitutional amendment
like practical men for practical reasons and so as to take care of
practical situations. The complexity of international affairs is
far too great today for us to stop being practical and cripple our
power to negotiate effectively with other nations, on merely
conjectural grounds.
CONCLUSION
The essence of both drafts of the proposed constitutional
amendment is nullification by states of one of the most impor-
tant functions of the national government. Therefore, it is highly
appropriate to quote against this proposal the statement made
by James Madison toward the end of his life on the attempted
nullification by a state of the tariff laws of the United States:86
"A political system which does not contain an effective
provision for a peaceable decision of all controversies arising
within itself, would be a government in name only. Such a
provision is obviously essential; and it is equally obvious
that it cannot be either peaceable or effective by making
every part [of the nation] an authoritative empire. The
final appeal in such cases must be to the authority of the
whole, not to that of the parts separately and independently.
... It was this view which dictated the [supremacy] clause."
86. 3 Farrand 537-538, written in 1835 or 1836.
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